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I am grateful to Saul Smilansky and Yotam Lurie for their papers on two chapters of my 
book, Aristotle’s Hand.1 Their papers are rich in comments and observations, and I have to be 
selective in my responses. I focus on the main criticisms they raise and on what I think are 
misunderstandings. 
Response to Smilansky 
Smilansky discusses the second chapter of my book, “Determinism and Free Will.” Having 
an expert on the free will literature like Smilansky discuss this chapter is obviously an 
excellent opportunity to improve and clarify it. Moreover, Smilansky’s view on free will is 
different from mine, and his paper is therefore mainly critical. Although I think that some of 
his criticisms rest on a misunderstanding, which I explain below, others do express 
significant philosophical differences. 
In the third section of that chapter, “On the Nature of Free Will,” I characterized a person’s 
free actions as those that are influenced by considerations of reward and punishment, praise 
and blame. I also claimed that it is this responsiveness which is essential to free actions: we 
shouldn’t look for any special ‘internal’ causal relation, mental or otherwise, that 
characterizes free action. Different free actions are done for different reasons and in different 
ways, some after careful deliberation, some on the spur of the moment, some without any 
thought but out of habit, and others in other ways. There is no uniform causal or mental 
description that applies to all these kinds of action. What is common to all is that had the 
person known that he would be punished or rewarded, praised or blamed in other ways than 
he thought he would be, he would have acted differently. This, I claimed, is what is essential 
to free actions. After discussing several implications of this characterisation, I continued in 
the fourth section of the chapter to show that if this characterisation is accepted then free will 
and determinism are compatible. Smilansky does not criticize this conditional compatibility 
but rather its antecedent, namely, my characterisation of free will. 
Smilansky argues that unacceptable consequences follow from my position. On pages 42–45 
of my book, I discussed and approved the following consequence. Standards of reward and 
punishment, praise and blame change between societies. Accordingly, while one society 
might have standards that would be sufficient to deter a person from doing something, 
another society might have more lenient standards that would not suffice to deter him from 
doing it. It follows that this person acts freely according to the standards of the former 
society, but not according to those of the latter. A case I considered is that of the 
kleptomaniac, who could be deterred by the stricter punishments of a society different from 
the one in which he lives. Smilansky objects that this kleptomaniac, not acting freely in the 
society in which he actually lives, would have been free in the stricter society, a conclusion 
that he finds absurd. 
However, this is not the conclusion that follows from my position. The conclusion is not that 
the kleptomaniac is actually not acting freely but would have acted so had he done exactly the 
same thing in the stricter society. The conclusion is that he is not acting freely according to 
the more lenient standards but is acting so according to the stricter ones. That is the most that 
can be said in response to the question, following his theft, ‘Did he then act freely or didn’t 
he?’ The classification of some kleptomaniacs as acting under compulsion and not freely was 
not introduced following a discovery about their true nature. It was following a decision on 
what are the appropriate sanctions for the offenses they tend to commit. 
We can think of this position as follows. Normal human beings can exist only in a society; 
“man is by nature a political animal.”2  Societies have to have norms of reward and 
punishments, which do vary between them but not arbitrarily or to any degree. Now some 
actions will be rendered voluntary by all these norms, some will be rendered voluntary by 
none (e.g., breathing), and yet others will be rendered voluntary only by some. These last 
actions, existing on that vague borderline, are free only according to some human standards, 
but not absolutely. Unlike the conclusion that Smilansky draws from my views, I find this 
one intuitive. 
Smilansky’s misunderstanding, however, was partly my fault. On page 43 of my book, I had 
the interlocutor draw Smilansky’s conclusion as an objection to my position. I then did not 
distance myself from it but left my position ambiguous between the social relativity that my 
interlocutor and Smilansky ascribe to me and the relativity to standards that I have formulated 
in the previous paragraphs and also on pages 44–45 of my book. I hope that the discussion 
above clarifies my position. 
Before we leave our kleptomaniac to his misdeeds, I’d like to consider Smilansky’s 
description of the kleptomaniac’s psychology. He provides a lively description of the 
kleptomaniac’s frame of mind when desisting from theft due to a police officer standing at 
his elbow. In the “struggle between the irrational compulsions and the terrifying social fear 
no place seems left for a free and morally responsible agent,” he concludes. However, I do 
not think that this irrationality and swirl of emotions are a sufficient reason not to consider a 
person free and morally responsible. Murderers and rapists almost invariably act irrationally 
and while caught in a swirl of emotions, but for all that they are considered free and culpable, 
something I am sure Smilansky would not wish to deny. If the kleptomaniac is not acting 
freely, it is not because of his irrationality but because our systems of reward, punishment, 
praise and blame cannot affect his behaviour. 
Smilansky also characterizes my position as “deeply revisionist” and claims that it “comes 
with a very high potential price” (note 1). This price, he continues, is because “it is likely that 
people would not take kindly to being blamed, if they came to believe that they did not 
deserve to be blamed but were merely being blamed because of social usefulness.” This, 
however, is not a consequence of my position. People deserve to be blamed if they wouldn’t 
have done the wrong they did, had they known that they would be blamed or punished for it. 
Systems of praise and blame (which are always tailored to human nature) exist because of 
their social necessity, but they render only those actions free which are responsive to them. I 
don’t think that people would feel injustice is done when someone is blamed for a wrong he 
did only because he thought he could get away with it. I therefore think my position is not 
revisionist in the way Smilansky thinks it is. 
Another particular difficulty Smilansky finds with my position is that, according to him, it 
cannot justify blaming the criminals rather than society in case the lenient sanctions of the 
latter are insufficient to deter the former from performing their crimes. According to the 
standards of that society these criminals are not acting freely, and it might be seen as its fault 
that it did not enforce stricter sanctions that would have deterred the criminals. 
Sometimes indeed a society should be blamed for not enforcing satisfactory sanctions, but 
irrespective of that, let us consider an instance in which Smilansky’s description applies. I 
think looking at the details will vindicate my position. Suppose that the punishments, 
disapproval, and social sanctions in our society do not suffice to deter a particular person 
from acting violently towards family and friends. Perhaps if we had inflicted on him severe 
physical punishment this would have been effective, but we are of course not interested in 
that since we regard such measures as inhumane. We then indeed do not consider him a free 
agent but an irrevocably corrupt person. We might arrest him because he is a threat to his 
environment, we might even put him in an appropriate ward: we try not to correct but to 
control him. It is not that we think he is blameless; on the contrary, we think of him as 
someone who has lost some of his dignity, for human dignity lies also in human freedom. 
Smilansky also raises a general worry concerning my analysis of free action. He grants that 
determinism is compatible with a distinction “between people who can and those who cannot 
be influenced by social incentives.” He argues, however, that this is insufficient as a 
vindication of compatibilism. Compatibilism, he maintains, comes in two versions: apart 
from the one just mentioned there is another one, which claims—if I understood him 
correctly—that responsibility is compatible with determinism, and this kind of compatibilism 
he wishes to deny. We need to acknowledge, he writes, “that the compatibilist form of life is 
deeply unjust, because ultimately no one can be responsible for the sources of her motivation 
and concomitant actions” (italics added). 
With this criticism, we arrive at a discussion of conceptual analysis in general and the 
question whether my account of free actions can be considered a correct analysis of the 
concept. In my book I proceeded as follows. I started from the common practice, both in 
daily life and in legal discourse, of classifying some actions as done freely and others as 
unfree (done under duress, for instance). I tried to specify the criteria that guide our 
application of this concept of acting freely, and I found them in responsiveness to 
considerations of praise and blame, reward and punishment. (For the sake of the following 
argument, we can assume I have succeeded in doing that.) Is this enough for claiming that I 
gave a correct analysis of the concept? 
Undoubtedly, apart from the criteria we use to apply a concept, we often have all sorts of 
pictures or assumptions about additional properties that the things to which the concept 
applies have. These pictures and assumptions, although playing no role in the application of a 
concept, might occasionally be mentioned in explaining it. However, because they play no 
such role, if they are discovered to be mistaken then this is no obstacle for the continued use 
of the concept. If the pictures or assumptions are what made us interested in the concept, the 
concept might indeed drop out of use; but not because it is incoherent but because it is no 
longer of interest. 
How is it with free action and Smilansky’s idea of ‘ultimate responsibility’? According to 
Smilansky, this idea cannot play any role in the actual application of the concept of free 
action. Smilansky has argued that whether or not we are determinists, this idea is in fact 
incoherent.3 We are, he has maintained, acting under the illusion that our actions are free. 
Since an illusory, incoherent idea cannot be what determines the actual applications of a 
concept, Smilansky has to concede that our actual identifications of actions as free are 
independent of this idea of ultimate responsibility. His ‘ultimate responsibility’ belongs to a 
picture that may accompany his use of the concept, but is not part of the criteria used to apply 
it. Moreover, Smilansky agrees that the practices of reward and punishment, praise and blame 
are essential to society and should be maintained. So according to him, the ‘ultimate 
responsibility’ idea does not play any conceptual role in the application of the concept of free 
action, it is incoherent, and the concept shall continue to be used despite the idea’s 
incoherence. All this seems to indicate that the incoherent ‘ultimate responsibility’ idea is 
irrelevant and should be dismissed, while the concept of free action should and will be 
maintained. 
We come across this idea of ‘ultimate responsibility’ only in philosophical contexts. 
Reflecting on our concept of free actions and attempting to reconcile it with various views of 
causality and responsibility, some philosophers have been misled to conceive the incoherent 
idea of an uncaused cause for which we are still responsible. Perhaps this is a natural illusion, 
the way the sea on the horizon cannot but look higher than the seashore – although the 
illusion does not occur in Plato or Aristotle. Yet be that as it may, it is a philosophical 
illusion, playing no role in our practice, an idle wheel that turns nothing. The illusion that 
should be exposed is not one involved in our concept of free action, which is coherent and 
indispensable, but the one in some philosophical reflections on that concept. 
Response to Lurie 
Lurie discusses the last chapter of my book, “On Philosophy.” In it, I characterized 
philosophy as contributing not to knowledge but to understanding. I continued to describe 
two ways in which this can be a significant contribution, and Lurie thinks that these are 
incompatible. After summarizing my views, I explain why I disagree. 
Philosophical inquiries are conceptual. Philosophers do not predict or expect new 
observations or experiments to verify their claims. Sometimes – for instance, when reflecting 
on some scientific theory – they engage with concepts and theories that scientists have forged 
in an attempt to explain various observations and experiments, but their own reflections are 
not hostage to further empirical discoveries. 
We might then ask, what is the point in such reflections? People usually understand what they 
mean when they use this or that word, and if some word or concept is insufficiently clear, 
they consult a dictionary, not a philosopher. One answer is that we often have wrong pictures 
or assumptions on what our concepts involve; exposing these can be valuable in various 
ways, and this is something a philosopher can do. 
In my response to Smilansky, for instance, we saw how some have thought that an idea of 
‘ultimate’ responsibility, which might be incoherent, is involved in our descriptions of some 
actions as done freely. This conviction has brought some people to conclude that we are not 
‘ultimately’ responsible for what we do, a conclusion they thought should or might have 
significant practical consequences. By contrast, I tried to show there that this idea is not 
involved in our identification of these actions and that it is redundant, an idle wheel that does 
no work. The idea of ‘ultimate’ responsibility has caused intellectual distress, which, often 
together with some related ideas – the apparent incompatibility of free action and 
determinism, for instance – has preoccupied philosophers, theologians, and others over the 
generations. The philosophical work, if done properly, should relieve us from this distress. In 
this sense, it is a kind of philosophical, intellectual therapy. Herein lies one significant value 
of philosophy. 
This value does not render philosophy quietist, despite Lurie’s claims to the contrary. 
Quietism is a calm acceptance of things as they are without attempts to resist or change them. 
Considering the above free-action discussion, philosophical reflection indeed did not bring us 
to dismiss or change our view of some actions as free; however, it did bring us to resist and 
try to change the way people often reflect on free action and responsibility. Moreover, when 
this approach is practiced, certainly no calm acceptance is exhibited by any of the 
discussants! So no Quietism here. 
I also described in my book an additional value of philosophy, this time a contribution to 
science. Conceptual misunderstandings of the kind mentioned above exist also among 
scientists, and their elimination can open up new scientific possibilities. One historical 
example I gave was that of Descartes’ realization of the relative nature of motion: bodies 
move relative to each other, and there is no meaning to absolute motion.4 This realization 
made possible the developments of a variety of physical theories, among them, much later, 
Einstein’s relativity theories. Descartes’ realization was of a conceptual nature, relying on no 
contingent empirical fact or any specialist knowledge, and yet it opened up new horizons to 
scientific inquiry. I think the possibility and even need for such additional conceptual 
contributions, in physics, psychology, and elsewhere, still exist. Herein lies an additional 
significant value of philosophy. 
This kind of contribution to the sciences does not reduce philosophy into their handmaid, as 
Lurie suggests. Conceptual, theoretical, and empirical work are here bound together, 
including in some of the most important breakthroughs in the history of science. I don’t think 
this diminishes in any way the significance of philosophy. 
Is there any tension between the two contributions? I don’t think so. Both are conceptual in 
nature, exposing misleading pictures and unjustified assumptions. When philosophy engages 
with scientific investigation, this can have constructive results, leading to new theoretical 
possibilities; while such constructive results do not often follow when misleading pictures are 
eliminated from our reflections on our ordinary concepts. (A mixture of the two contributions 
may also occur, as I think is the case with some philosophical criticisms of recent work in 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience.) This difference, however, is no reason to see any 
incompatibility between the two contributions. 
Perhaps Lurie thought that there is such an incompatibility because of a misunderstanding of 
a passage in my book. He quotes me as saying, on page 130, that philosophy’s value is 
mainly therapeutic. He apparently took me to mean there that this is true of philosophy 
generally. However, as a rereading of that passage would show, I was talking at that place 
about the philosophical resolution of the sceptical dream argument and of the alleged 
incompatibility of free will and determinism. My claim was not on philosophy’s contribution 
generally. 
Lurie concludes with a remark on the value of philosophy as traditionally practiced. I 
maintained in my book that conceptual confusions have brought philosophers to construct a 
variety of metaphysical theories, which, once the confusions are eliminated, are eliminated 
with them. These are constructions whose substance is the mist of misunderstanding, and 
they disappear once it is dispersed. Lurie, however, suggests that these constructions might 
still be of interpretative significance, broadening our understanding and making sense of the 
world. 
The metaphysical theories of Plato, Descartes, and others have certainly played a pivotal role 
in the development of civilization. And philosophical systems have also contributed in a 
variety of other ways to our conceptions of ourselves and of nature. This I did not challenge 
in my book. On the contrary, these contributions are the very reason a critique of metaphysics 
justifies the intellectual effort it requires. Interpretations are part of human nature and of 
culture, and with them come misinterpretations. And from the Pre-Socratics on, philosophers 
have developed a variety of metaphysical theories that involved misinterpretations and 
misunderstandings. The philosophical effort to demolish these misconstructions is necessary 
precisely because of the philosophical tendency to construct them. For only in this way can 
we get a clear view of both man and world.
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